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Abstract 
In this commentary, we discuss an important pattern of results in the literature on the neural 
basis of expertise: (a) decrease of cerebral activation at the beginning of acquisition of 
expertise and (b) functional cerebral reorganization, as a consequence of years of practice. 
We show how these two results can be integrated with the neural reuse framework.  
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In After Phrenology, Anderson presented the neural reuse framework, which opposes both 
modular and holistic views of brain architecture. In evolutionary terms, neural reuse claims 
that the brain evolves, not by adding new specialized modules, but by acquiring new 
functions by re-combining local areas in new ways. Ontogenetically, neural reuse involves 
the processes of interactive differentiation (local areas have different profiles and interact in 
different ways as a function of development) and neural search (the active testing of multiple 
neuronal combinations until finding the most appropriate one for a specific skill, i.e., the 
neural niche of that skill). 
 
One testable hypothesis of the neural reuse framework is that novices in a domain of 
expertise would show wide-spread brain activation when performing a domain-specific task, 
whereas experts would show a more focused pattern of brain activity. This is because, at the 
beginning of acquiring a skill, the brain is searching for an appropriate combination of areas, 
whereas the experts’ brain has already settled in a specific network of brain areas to perform 
domain-specific tasks. Indeed, Anderson (2014) presents data supporting this hypothesis 
(e.g., Merabet et al., 2008; Petersen, van Mier, Fiez, & Raichle, 1998; Petersson, Elfgren, & 
Ingvar, 1997; Poldrack, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998). 
 
The field of research on the neural implementation of expertise has been very prolific in the 
last 15 years; therefore, it seems pertinent to evaluate Anderson’s hypothesis exhaustively in 
light of new data. In fact, Guida, Gobet, Tardieu and Nicolas (2012; see also Guida, Gobet, & 
Nicolas, 2013) reviewed the literature on neural implementation of expertise in tasks related 
to working memory. They found two effects: (a) studies investigating individuals who 
receive training in working memory-related tasks (from 2 hours up to 5 weeks) show mainly 
a decrease of cerebral activity in prefrontal and parietal working memory areas after training, 
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while (b) studies using experts and novices in different fields performing domain-specific 
working memory-related tasks tend to show that the brain areas activated to perform those 
tasks differ between novices and experts (Guida et al., 2012, referred to this effect as 
functional neural reorganization). As suggested by Anderson (2014), the first effect (i.e., the 
reduction of brain activity due to a number of hours of training) is consistent with the process 
of neural search. Even though the second effect was not envisaged by Anderson (2014), we 
propose that it is also compatible with neural search. The first effect reflects the fact that a 
developed skill finds a neural niche within the network of brain areas used at the beginning of 
skill acquisition, whereas functional neural reorganization reflects a more radical type of 
neural search: the skill finds its neural niche in a different set of brain areas. In the rest of this 
commentary, we explain in more detail these two effects, which are connected by Guida and 
colleagues in a two-stage framework, and link them to the three implications of the neural 
reuse framework that Anderson (2015) put forward in his précis (p. 2). 
 
Experts: Re-using the mediotemporal lobe. 1) “First and most obvious, newly acquired 
capacities are generally supported by mixing and matching the same neural elements in new 
ways.” This first implication is in accordance with the expertise literature. As a consequence 
of their extended practice, experts develop domain-specific knowledge structures (i.e., chunks 
and more sophisticated knowledge structures; see an explanation in the next section). These 
new knowledge structures allow experts to re-use the mediotemporal lobe in a completely 
different way compared to novices (Campitelli, Gobet, Head, Buckley & Parker, 2007; Guida 
et al., 2012, 2013). While novices typically use episodic long-term memory areas (e.g., the 
mediotemporal lobe) for performing long-term memory tasks, experts are able to (re)use 
these areas also for performing working memory tasks.  
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As theorized by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) and Gobet and Simon (1996), this occurs when 
there is a tight connection between working memory and long-term memory through retrieval 
cues or slotted schemas, which allow a fast transfer of information between these two types 
of memory (see also Gobet, 2000a, 2000b). Therefore, the interaction between working 
memory and long-term memory is crucial for functional neural reorganization to take place. 
This certainly echoes Anderson’s (2014, p.40) view that “function depends much more on the 
interactions between parts than on the actions of parts,” and relates to Anderson’s (2014, p. 
296) second principle of a functionalist neuroscience: “our complex and diverse behavioral 
repertoire is supported primarily by the brain’s ability to dynamically establish multiple 
different functional coalitions.” 
 
The relation between working memory and episodic long-term memory also relates to 
another interesting effect described by Anderson: unmasking. The basic idea is that brain 
regions are supposed to be specialized to process one type of input (e.g., the occipital cortex 
is supposed to be specialized in processing visual input). However, under special conditions 
in which the source of dominant input is disrupted (e.g., injury, sensory deprivation), this 
brain area can process a different type of input, unmasking a new processing capacity for this 
area. Moreover, Anderson argues that the disruption of normal input is not a necessary 
condition, and that unmasking can be observed also under more typical conditions. The 
development of expertise, as postulated by the two-stage framework, offers a good example 
of this. It is indeed possible that the decrease of activity in the first stage may help the 
unmasking and thus re-use of the mediotemporal lobe, allowing the occurrence of the second 
stage. We also agree with Anderson when he proposes that unmasking must not be seen as 
passive. From our point of view, functional neural reorganization occurs through the use of 
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knowledge structures. The efficiency of these structures is a necessary condition. However, 
the biological reasons that undergird such processes are unknown. 
 
Experts: Re-using spatial processes. 2) “Second, and perhaps less obvious, neural reuse 
would appear to support and encourage procedural and behavioral reuse.” Guida et al. 
(2012) provided an explanation of the cognitive processes that both cause and are the 
consequence of the two identified patterns of brain activity in expertise studies. The first 
stage – decrease of cerebral activity – has been linked to chunking (Chase & Simon, 1973; 
Cowan, 2001; Gobet et al., 2001). When practice begins, individuals start binding various 
domain-specific patterns (e.g., in chess, configurations of pieces) together, which ultimately 
result in a compression (Mathy & Feldman, 2012) of the elements into one structure, a chunk. 
Once chunks are built, separate domain-specific patterns can be processed as one element, 
which means that less cognitive resources are needed, and this is reflected as a reduction of 
brain activation to perform a domain-specific task. As a consequence of practice and 
expertise, chunks grow in size (e.g., Cowan, Chen, & Rouder, 2004; Chen & Cowan, 2005) 
and complexity (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 1996) and with years of 
training, they become high hierarchical chunks: knowledge structures. These structures 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Gobet & Simon, 1996) allow experts to encode information in 
episodic long-term memory in a fast and reliable fashion even in conditions typical of 
working memory tasks (rapid presentation of several elements), which is not possible for 
novices using similar cell assemblies in the mediotemporal lobe.  
 
As pointed out above, to be able to use episodic long-term memory in a fast and reliable 
fashion, individuals must develop specific knowledge structures. This illustrates how human 
beings, “repurpose our behavioral routines in multiple circumstances for myriad cognitive 
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ends” (Anderson, 2015, p. 16). A well-known example in the domain of expertise is the 
method of loci, which is thought to be the first (internal) mnemonic (Worthen & Hunt, 2011; 
Yates, 1966), initially proposed by Simonides of Ceos more than two millennia ago. In 
ancient Greece, orators would visualize a sequence of familiar locations (in their house or a 
familiar route with salient locations) before a speech, and use them to mentally store 
important words. Subsequently, during their speech, they would take a mental tour and 
retrieve each word through the familiar locations. This technique is still in use among expert 
mnemonists (Pridmore, 2013). Maguire, Valentine, Wilding, and Kapur (2003) revealed the 
functional cerebral pattern of these mental walks by comparing mnemonists with all-comers. 
They found comparable activations in both groups in prefrontal working memory areas, but 
specific activations for the mnemonists, in the left medial superior parietal cortex, in the 
bilateral retrosplenial cortex and in the right posterior hippocampus (for a similar pattern see 
also Pesenti et al., 2001); these regions are important for episodic memory and crucial for 
spatial memory and navigation (e.g., Burgess, Maguire & O’Keefe, 2002). Therefore, it 
seems that with hours of training, mnemonists are capable of using the mental image of their 
house (or of a route) as a slotted schema and transfer the incoming information from working 
memory to long-term memory by associating the new information with each slot (the familiar 
locations), instead of simply storing the information in working memory. The consequence of 
the use of the method of loci is an increased memory capacity and cerebral functional 
reorganization.  
 
This example clearly shows how experts reuse spatial cognitive processes to encode verbal 
information. These elements are linked to the point 7 of Anderson’s précis, “Reuse, 
interaction, and “higher-order” cognition,” and perfectly illustrate the fact that “we have 
found ways to reuse our physical capacities to augment our mental ones; in a process 
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supported by neural reuse” (Anderson, 2015, p. 16). Interestingly, a similar process has also 
been found in “all-comers”. Van Dijck and Fias (2011, see also Guida, Leroux, Lavielle-
Guida, & Noël, under review) showed that verbal information processed in immediate 
memory was mentally organized from left to right based on the order of presentation. This 
suggests that order in working memory could be coded through spatial positional tagging 
(Abrahamse, van Dijck, Majerus, & Fias, 2014; Guida & Lavielle-Guida, 2014). Based on 
this idea, Guida and Lavielle-Guida (2014) proposed that spatial positional tags in all-comers 
were comparable to the spatial locations of expert mnemonists, proposing the generic term of 
spatialization. The final twist that links all-comers to expertise is that the left to right spatial 
positional tagging observed in all-comers could be due to expertise in reading and writing.  
 
Experts vs. Novices: same working-memory tasks but different processes and cerebral 
substratum. 3) the third implication…not every cognitive achievement…need be supported 
by a specific targeted adaptation. As emphasized by Anderson, the last implication follows 
neatly from the previous points. Indeed, we believe that the assemblies of neurons that code 
for location did not evolve for encoding and retrieving words like in the method of loci. This 
example enters in a much wider picture when taking into account working memory. It is well-
established that prefronto-parietal areas are crucial for working memory in all-comers 
(Cowan, 2011; Postle, Berger, & D’Esposito, 1999; Postle & D’Esposito, 1999; Todd & 
Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). However, as highlighted above (see also Guida et 
al., 2012, 2013), when experts execute working memory related-tasks within their domain of 
expertise, completely different brains areas are activated (e.g., the mediotemporal lobe). In 
this case, expertise via new assemblies of cells allows experts to circumvent the limits of 
working memory by using a part of episodic long-term memory. This shows that a same 
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cognitive achievement (here working memory task) needs not to be supported by a specific 
targeted adaptation. 
 
Conclusion. The neural reuse framework proposes that the same assemblies of cells can be 
used for different cognitive functions or tasks in different contexts. Research into the neural 
implementations of expertise supports Anderson’s (2014) hypothesis that brain activity 
decreases and becomes more focalized when a skill is learned. However, another pattern of 
results in the expertise literature was not envisaged by Anderson – a change of the set of 
networks used to perform a working memory task as a function of expertise. We presented an 
explanation of how this effect can be explained by the concept of neural reuse.  
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